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WHY SHOULD GANG MEMBERSHIP BE A "STATUS"
SYMBOL? STATUS CRIMES AND CITY OF CHICAGO V.
YOUKHANA
MARK D. BROOKSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment commands that "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required... nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."1
This principle, adopted with slight modification from the 1688 English
Declaration of Rights,2 although initially used in the United States to
prohibit certain types of barbaric punishment, also acted as a judicial
check on the legislature's "unfettered power to prescribe punishments
for crimes."3
One such check the Supreme Court placed on state legislatures
was to declare it unconstitutional to enact a law that criminalizes a
party's status. In Robinson v. California,4 the Court struck down a
state statute making it a crime to be addicted to narcotics in
California.' While Robinson prohibits the criminalization of mere
status, it does not invalidate statutes that criminalize acts relating to
status. In Powell v. Texas,6 the Court held that, although the
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2001;
B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1992. Chicago-Kent Law Review selected this Comment as the
Best Case Comment from the 1999 Summer Candidacy Competition. Each summer, the Law
Review invites students to participate in a vigorous ten day, limited page, closed-research
writing competition. The Law Review then selects new members from the competition based
on writing ability. The 1999-2000 Editorial Board voted Mr. Brookstein's Comment: Why
Should Gang Membership Be a "Status" Symbol? as the Best Case Comment based on its
insightful analysis and effective organization.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. See Juliet Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm for
Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 306 (1996). James
Madison replaced the English "ought not" with "shall not." Id.
3. See id. at 307.
4. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
5. The Court held that "a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal,
even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any
irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 667.
6. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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defendant could not be prosecuted for his status as an alcoholic, he
could be punished for the act of appearing drunk in a public place in
violation of the Texas Penal Code.7 While the Court has provided
this status/act distinction for determining culpable conduct, it has left
courts to grapple with the question of determining whether a
particular status falls under the holding of Robinson.
In City of Chicago v. Youkhana,8 the Illinois Court of Appeals
struck down a city ordinance making it illegal for gang members to
loiter.9 The court found the statute both void for vagueness and
violative of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Clause,
because it criminalized the status of being a gang member. 0 It is
important to note, however, that the Supreme Courts of both Illinois
and the United States found the ordinance to be void for vagueness,
thereby not reaching the question of whether the gang-loitering
ordinance unconstitutionally criminalized a person's status in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.11
Therefore, because the city will undoubtedly draft another
ordinance, the status question will again be raised and ultimately
need to be resolved. Accordingly, in order to establish its value as
precedent, it is necessary to review the Illinois Appellate Court's
finding that the gang-loitering ordinance in Youkhana violated the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
7. See id. at 532.
8. 660 N.E.2d 34 (I11. App. Ct. 1995), affd City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 59
(I11. 1997), aff'd City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). The Illinois Supreme Court
consolidated over 70 appeals, including Youkhana, under the name Morales. See 687 N.E.2d at
57.
9. See 660 N.E.2d at 36. The gang-loitering ordinance provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a
criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other
persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the
area. Any person who does not promptly obey such an order is in violation of this
section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no
person who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street gang.
(c) As used in this Section:
'Loiter' means to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.
'Criminal Street Gang' means any ongoing organization, association in fact or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having a one of its
substantial activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts
enumerated in paragraph (3), and whose members individually or collectively
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
'Public place' means the public way and any other location open to the public,
whether publicly or privately owned.
Id. (quoting CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015 (1992)).
10. See id. at 41-42.
11. See Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 59; Morales, 527 U.S. at 50-51.
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In concluding that prosecution of the defendants in Youkhana
violated the Eighth Amendment by criminalizing status, the Illinois
Court of Appeals failed to apply the two-part test mandated by the
United States Supreme Court: first, whether a particular status falls
under the holding in Robinson; and second, whether such party's
conduct is culpable under Powell. Although the Supreme Court has
not articulated an exact test for determining whether these elements
are satisfied, a review of Robinson and Powell, in addition to other
status-related cases, reveals several factors that form the rubric under
which Youkhana should be analyzed.
Part I of this Comment outlines the background necessary to
develop the factors needed to analyze the question of gang-
membership status in Youkhana. Part II considers the analysis
employed by the Illinois Appellate Court in Youkhana. Finally, Part
III proposes a model by which to properly analyze the question of
gang-member status.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF FACTORS USED IN ANALYSIS
A. Status Crimes and Vagrancy
Due to the labor shortage caused by the Black Plague in England
during the fourteenth century, vagrancy laws arose in order to
prevent laborers from migrating from their respective feudal estates.
This resulted in a fixed workforce and low wages. 12 As the feudal
system crumbled, these vagrancy laws shifted from controlling labor
to controlling the potentially criminal behavior of those "persons
deemed to be suspicious or vaguely undesirable," including the poor
and unemployed. 13 However, a differentiation between criminal and
noncriminal vagrancy developed, and by 1744, while the status of a
vagrant whose purpose was to engage in criminal conduct was illegal,
the mere status of being poor was not.14 Unlike England, American
vagrancy laws that survived the end of English rule were used to
punish both criminal and noncriminal undesirable behavior, such as
loitering and being a vagabond. 5 Such vagrant or vagabond status
amounted to a status crime because the party was not guilty of an
12. See Joel D. Berg, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang Loitering Laws, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 461,462-63 (1993); see also Smith, supra note 2, at 301.
13. Smith, supra note 2, at 301.
14. See Berg, supra note 12, at 463-64.
15. See id.
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illegal act, but merely an illegal status.16
Eventually, however, attitudes toward the poor and unemployed
changed, and, in 1941, the Supreme Court stated: "We do not think
that it will now be seriously contended that because a person is
without employment and without funds he constitutes a 'moral
pestilence,"' and that, "poverty and immorality are not
synonymous."'1 7  Another blow to vagrancy laws came when the
Supreme Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville8 struck down a
Jacksonville, Florida vagrancy ordinance. 19 The Court held that, aside
from being unconstitutionally vague, the ordinance also criminalized
innocent behavior such as nightwalking and loafing.20  Before
Papachristou was decided, many lower state and federal courts were
striking down vagrancy laws under a number of theories, including
violation of the Eighth Amendment for punishing "economic
status."21  Therefore, just as had happened in England, American
courts were now making a distinction between a party's status that, by
definition, is criminal in nature and status that is innocent, such as
being poor or strolling at night.
This criminallnoncriminal distinction is important in formulating
an analytical model by which to analyze the gang-member status
question. Thus, one factor to consider in determining whether a
party's status would fall under the holding in Robinson, is the extent
to which illegality or illegal purpose is built into the very definition of
the party's status.22
16. See Smith, supra note 2, at 302.
17. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
18. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
19. 405 U.S. at 172. The stuck-down Jacksonville ordinance provided:
Rogues and Vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards,
common nightwalkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property,
lewd, wanton, and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and
brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful
business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gambling
houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work
but habitually aliving upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be
deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court, shall be punished as
provided for Class D offenses.
Id. at 156-57 n.1 (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1965)).
20. See id. at 170-71.
21. Smith, supra note 2, at 303 n.58.
22. On a continuum, "innocent" status at one end would weigh in favor of inclusion under
Robinson, whereas "criminal" status at the other end would weigh against.
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B. Status, the Eighth Amendment, and Robinson
In Robinson, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
making it illegal to be addicted to narcotics in California. 23 There, the
defendant was arrested for violating an ordinance prohibiting drug
addiction after a police officer noticed "scar tissue and discoloration
on the inside" of the defendant's right arm and "what appeared to be
numerous needle marks" and a scab on his left arm three inches
below the elbow. 24 The trial judge instructed the jury that they could
convict if they found either that the defendant had the status of being
addicted to drugs or had actually used drugs. 25  In reversing the
conviction, the Court held that because the ordinance required no
illegal act but only the status of being an addict, it violated the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 26
It is important to note that the Court's reasoning lay in its finding
that drug addiction is a disease that can be acquired innocently or
involuntarily. Therefore, the crime could be committed without
moral fault: "It is unlikely that any state at this moment in history
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be
mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. '27
The Court further noted, "[i]n this Court counsel for the state
recognized that narcotic addiction is an illness. 28  Indeed, it is
apparently an illness which may be contracted innocently or
23. See 370 U.S. at 667. The ordinance in question provided:
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of
narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person licensed
by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden of the
defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of violating
any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve
a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail. The court
may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for a period not to exceed five
years and shall in all cases in which probation is granted require as a condition thereof
that such person be confined in the county jail for at least 90 days. In no event does
the court have the power to absolve a person who violates this section from the
obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.
Id. at 661 (quoting CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11721).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 662-63.
26. See id. at 666.
27. Id.
28. The Court stated in a footnote:
In its brief the appellee stated: "Of course it is generally conceded that a narcotic
addict, particularly one addicted to the use of heroin, is in a state of mental and
physical illness. So is an alcoholic." Thirty-seven years ago this Court recognized that
persons addicted to narcotics "are diseased and proper subjects for [medical
treatment]."
Id. at 667 n.8 (citation omitted).
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involuntarily." 9
In his concurrence, Justice Douglas emphasized that not only is
drug addiction a disease, but also that "[t]he addict is under
compulsions not capable of management without outside help. '30
Therefore, "[w]e would forget the teachings of the Eighth
Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted
sick people to be punished for being sick."31
Thus, where a status is recognized as a sickness or disease,
acquired innocently or involuntarily, and incapable of management
without outside help, these factors weigh heavily in favor of inclusion
under Robinson. Conversely, factors weighing against inclusion
include voluntarily or recklessly acquiring a status not recognized as a
disease and capable of change without outside help. Again, the
notion of moral blameworthiness inherent in the status comes into
play.
C. Actus Reus, the Eighth Amendment, and Powell
In Powell, the Court limited Robinson by holding that, although
status cannot be criminalized, acts symptomatic of that status may
be.32 There, the defendant was arrested for appearing drunk in public
in violation of the Texas Penal Code.33 Although the defendant
argued that his status as an alcoholic was being unconstitutionally
punished because he was compelled to appear in public as a result of
his drinking, a plurality of the Court rejected that argument, finding
instead that Robinson does not extend to acts.
The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be
inflicted only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in
some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing, or
perhaps in historical common law terms, has committed some actus
reus.
34
The Court refused to accept the argument that the act of
appearing in public while intoxicated was involuntary given the state
29. Id. at 666-67.
30. Id. at 668-72.
31. Id. at 678.
32. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968).
33. See id. at 517. The code provides, "Whoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of
intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his own, shall be fined not
exceeding one hundred dollars." Id. at 516 (quoting VERNON'S ANN. TEXAS PENAL CODE art.
477 (1952)).
34. Id. at 533.
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of disagreement among experts regarding the nature of alcoholism.
3 5
Indeed, expert testimony merely established that the defendant had a
"'compulsion,' which was 'not completely overpowering,' but which
was 'an exceedingly strong influence,"' to appear in public as a result
of his alcoholism.3 6 This, the Court found, was not enough on which
to base a sweeping constitutional pronouncement that acts related to
status are not subject to punishment.
3 7
Furthermore, a key factor for the development of our analytical
model is that the Court found the prohibited conduct to be, "public
behavior which may create substantial health and safety hazards, both
for appellant and for members of the general public, and which
offends the moral and esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the
community."38 Therefore, another factor is the nature of the conduct
undertaken by the party whose status is in question.
While Justice White's concurrence agreed with the plurality39
that the record did not establish the involuntary nature of the
defendant's conduct, he disagreed with drawing a line between
involuntary conduct and status. Doing so "is like forbidding criminal
conviction for being sick with flu or epilepsy but permitting
punishment for running a fever or having a convulsion. '40  In
determining whether an act is involuntary, however, one must also
consider factors such as whether the party knew of their condition
and failed to take appropriate precautions.41  Therefore, another
factor to be weighed in the model is the extent to which conduct
stemming from the status may be deterred. The four dissenting
Justices, while disagreeing that the defendant's conduct was
voluntary, agreed with Justice White's focus on the principle in
35. See id. at 520.
36. Id. at 518.
37. See id. at 536.
3& Id. at 532.
39. See id. at 532-33. Justice Marshall announced the judgment of the Court and wrote an
opinion in which Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black, and Justice Harlan joined. Justice Black
submitted a concurrence, in which Justice Harlan joined. Justice White concurred only in the
judgment, and Justice Fortas wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan,
and Stewart.
40. Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring).
41. See id. at 550. As Justice White stated:
I cannot say that the chronic alcoholic who proves his disease is shielded from
conviction when he has knowingly failed to take feasible precautions against
committing a criminal act, here the act of going to or remaining in a public place. On
such facts the alcoholic is like a person with smallpox, who could be convicted for
being on the street but not for being ill, or, like the epileptic, who would be punished
for driving a car but not for his disease.
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Robinson that, "[c]riminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a
person for being in a condition he is powerless to change."42 While
the plurality never explicitly rejected the notion that involuntary
conduct stemming from status can be proven, it found that the record
failed to establish such involuntary conduct at trial.43
D. Subsequent Interpretations of Robinson and Powell
Picking up on these principles, a federal court in Florida held
that conduct inextricably related to involuntary status cannot be
punished.44 There, plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of over
6,000 homeless persons to enjoin the City of Miami from arresting
and harassing them for carrying on such essential life functions as
sleeping and bathing in public areas.45 Expert testimony established
that homelessness is an involuntary status because people rarely
choose to become homeless.46 Furthermore, evidence presented
established that the homeless had no choice but to perform certain
life-sustaining activities in public due to lack of shelter space in
Miami .4  The court held that because the homeless were engaged in
innocent conduct not harmful to themselves or others, and such
conduct could not be severed from their status, the defendant's
conduct amounted to a violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. 48  This conclusion makes sense
because conduct so connected to status ceases to be conduct as such,
and instead becomes implicit in the status itself. Therefore, in
analyzing the status question in Youkhana, another factor to consider
is not only the extent to which the conduct is innocent or voluntary,
but also whether the conduct merges with the status.
A federal court in Illinois focused on the nature of the conduct
being performed by the parties having a particular status, as the Court
42. Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 521-22. Justice Marshall stated:
In the first place, the record in this case is utterly inadequate to permit the sort of
informed and responsible adjudication which alone can support the announcement of
an important and wide ranging new constitutional principle. We know very little about
the circumstances surrounding the drinking bout which resulted in this conviction, or
about Leroy Powell's drinking problem, or indeed about alcoholism itself.
Id.
44. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
45. See id. at 1553-54.
46. See id. at 1563.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 1565.
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did in Powell. In Farber v. Rockford,49 the court struck down an
ordinance ° prohibiting parties with a particular status from
conducting otherwise innocent activities." The court distinguished
Powell, noting that appearing drunk in public was a harmful activity,
unlike innocuous activities such as loitering, strolling, or appearing in
public places where liquor is sold.12 Therefore, in analyzing not only
status, but also the conduct that results therefrom, it is important to
consider the nature of the activity undertaken. Thus, even if the
nature of the party's status is criminal-weighing against inclusion
under Robinson-the innocent or harmful nature of the conduct will
help tip the scale in either direction.
II. THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF ROBINSON AND POWELL IN
YO UKHANA
Although the court in Youkhana found that the gang-loitering
ordinance criminalized the status of being a gang member, it failed to
analyze, given the factors developed in Part I, whether "gang
member" qualifies as a status under Robinson. Furthermore, the
court did not consider whether the gang members' conduct is
nevertheless punishable under Powell. The court merely reiterated
the Supreme Court's ruling that status cannot be punished without
some actus reus5 3  The court also focused on Farber for the
proposition that innocent behavior connected to status may not be
punished.1
4
III. A PROPOSED MODEL FOR ANALYZING GANG STATUS
I propose the following model, incorporating the factors
developed above, as a methodology for analyzing whether being a
gang member should be considered a status that falls under the
49. 407 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
50. The questioned ordinance provided:
It shall be unlawful for any habitual drunkard, any person known to be a prostitute, or
any person who aids or abets prostitution, or for any person previously convicted of a
felony, of prostitution, or of aiding and abetting prostitution, to assemble or
congregate with other persons of any of the foregoing classes in or upon the public
ways or other public places in the city or to loaf or loiter in or about or frequent the
premises of any place where intoxicating liquors are sold.
MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO § 192-6.
51. See id. at 533.
52. See id.
53. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 41-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
54. See id. at 42.
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holding in Robinson:
(A) No state statute may criminalize a party's status or condition
under the Eighth Amendment, thereby subjecting the party to
arrest. Factors the court should weigh in determining whether a
party's status or condition is entitled to such protection include:
(1) extent to which the status or condition is recognized by
the medical or other relevant community as a sickness or
disease;
(2) extent to which offering party shows, through use of
expert testimony or otherwise, that the status or condition is
voluntary;
(3) extent to which party is powerless to change status or
condition without outside assistance;
(4) where the status or condition was acquired voluntarily, the
legality of the purpose for which the status or condition was
acquired; and
(5) extent to which the status or condition may be deterred by
the criminal law.
(B) If a party's status qualifies under Section (A), the party's acts
or conduct may be culpable under state criminal law. Factors the
court should weigh in determining culpable conduct include:
(1) extent to which the act or conduct is deemed harmful to
society for health, safety, moral, or aesthetic reasons;
(2) extent to which the act or conduct is inextricably related
to the status or condition;
(3) context of the act or conduct at the time of arrest; and
(4) extent to which such act or conduct may be deterred by
the criminal law.
Beginning with section (A) of the proposed model, while gang
membership may be considered a disease or illness in the colloquial
sense, it is unlikely that the medical community would consider it as
such. Therefore, this factor would weigh against inclusion under
Robinson. A more difficult question, however, concerns the extent to
which gang membership is voluntary. In Youkhana, no expert
testimony was given regarding the voluntary nature of gang
membership. Indeed, there is disagreement over whether gangs are
formed as the result of social and economic factors that leave the
person with no other viable option, or whether formation is the result
of individual choice.55 Because there is a presumption in criminal law
55. See, e.g., Thomas L. Doerr, Jr., A Failed Attempt to Take Back Our Streets-A
Constitutional Triumph for Gangs: City of Chicago v. Morales, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 447, 467
nn.140-41 (citing JOHN HAGEEDORN & PERRY MACON, PEOPLE AND FOLKS, GANGS, CRIME
AND THE UNDERCLASS IN A RUSTBELT CITY 112-13 (1988)).
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that social and economic factors do not negate voluntary choice, it
would be difficult to prove that joining a gang is involuntary. Related
to this question is the extent to which the status can be changed.
Again, expert testimony would need to be introduced, as in Pottinger,
to show whether, like homelessness, the individual is powerless to
change without outside help.
Focusing next on the criminal/noncriminal nature of the status,
the gang-loitering ordinance 6 states that a "criminal street gang" has
"as one of its substantial activities the commission of one or more of
the criminal acts enumerated in paragraph (3). ' ' 57 Therefore, by
definition, the status of gang member is criminal in nature. Such
criminal status, as opposed to economic or other innocent status,
weighs against inclusion. The ordinance further states that gangs
undertake the "commission, attempted commission, or solicitation"
of criminal offenses. 8 Arguably, gang membership is not a status at
all, but rather a continual state of conspiracy to engage in illegal
activity. Therefore, it is possible to equate gang membership to
conduct.
Another factor to consider is the extent to which the status can
be deterred. Gang membership is unlike homelessness or drug
addiction because parties typically do not voluntarily become
homeless or addicts. Because gang membership can be deterred by
the criminal law, this factor weighs against inclusion under Robinson.
On first glance, gang membership appears to be a status acquired
voluntarily, not the result of sickness or disease, and criminal in
nature. In this way, Youkhana seems strongly distinguishable from
other relevant cases, thus making the holding of Robinson
inapplicable. It is possible, albeit unlikely, that testimony introduced
at trial could establish that participating in a criminal gang is
equivalent to suffering from drug addiction.
However, even if "gang member" is found to be a recognized
status, the analysis must still continue under section (B) in order to
satisfy the mandate in PowelL First, a defendant is punishable if he
partakes in conduct deemed to be harmful to society, such as public
drunkenness. In hearings held on the subject of criminal street gangs
in Chicago, the city determined that "the presence of gang members
56. Although the ordinance was struck down by the court, the definitions incorporated
therein were not disputed, and therefore I rely on them here.
57. CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015 (1992).
58. Id.
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in public areas is intimidating to law-abiding citizens," and that
"gangs operate by establishing control over identifiable areas, by
loitering and intimidating others from entering those areas."5 9 These
hearings further found that "loitering in public places by criminal
street gang members creates a justifiable fear for the safety of persons
and property in the area.' 60 Clearly, this conduct is analogous to the
defendant's conduct in Powell, which the Court "deemed harmful to
society for health, safety, moral, or esthetic reasons. '61 Thus, such
conduct would be punishable.
Next, although such conduct may be inextricably tied to the
status of being a gang member, this is quite distinguishable from a
homeless person needing to sleep and bathe in public. Indeed, the
criminal must do criminal acts in order to survive as a criminal, but
this would hardly offer a justification for the conduct. Therefore,
Pottinger is inapplicable here. However, under the factor (B)(3), it
would be necessary to establish at trial whether such conduct was
actually taking place at the time of arrest in order to satisfy the actus
reus requirement.
Another factor the court must weigh is the extent to which the
conduct may be deterred. As previously noted, Justice White argued
in Powell that a party compelled to act as a result of their status
should not be punished. There, however, neither Justice White nor
the plurality was convinced that the defendant's behavior was so
compelled, and therefore, it could be deterred. Furthermore, the
extent to which it is feasible to guard against the conduct weighs into
the equation.
Here, if the conduct by the gang members is voluntary, then it
may be deterred by the criminal law. Therefore, absent expert
testimony proving that gang membership is involuntary and its
resulting conduct compelled, thus rendering deterrence ineffective,
such conduct is punishable.
CONCLUSION
While this Comment lacks empirical data and therefore cannot
establish whether gang status does in fact fall under the holding in
Robinson, it does provide an analytical model that a court may use to
determine whether such a finding of status is appropriate. While it
59. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 35.
60. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,46 (1999).
61. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968).
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appears that gang membership does not fall under Robinson and
other relevant case law, evidence introduced at trial may prove
otherwise.
